






Consciousness: Natural and Artificial
Abstract
Based on results from evolutionary psychology, we discuss important functions that can 
be served by consciousness in autonomous robots. These include deliberately controlled 
action, conscious awareness, self-awareness, metacognition, and ego consciousness. We 
distinguish intrinsic intentionality from consciousness, but argue it is also important to un-
derstanding robot cognition. Finally, we explore the Hard Problem for robots (i.e., whether 
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2. Less Hard Problems
Functional Consciousness
















One	 of	 the	 functions	 of	 consciousness	 is	 to	 control	 what	 is	 referred	 to	 as	


















In	 the	 terms	 of	 Heidegger’s	 phenomenology	 (e.g.,	 Heidegger,	 1962,	 1982;	
Dreyfus,	1991,	ch.	4),	in	our	ordinary	mode	of	skilful	coping,	we	encounter	
























One	 of	 the	 ways	 that	 consciousness	 can	 facilitate	 deliberately	 controlled	
action	 is	 by	 a	 process	 termed	 conscious awareness,	 that	 is,	 by	 integrating	








































Introductions	 to	 evolutionary	 psychology	
can	be	found	in	many	recent	textbooks,	such	








mals	need	 to	coordinate	several	 reference	frames,	 including	at	 least	world-


















another	 person,	 and	 come	 to	 an	 understanding	 about	 how	 one’s	 own	 psy-










Similar	 considerations	 apply	 to	 autonomous	 robots	 that	 implement	 higher-
level	learning	and	control	of	behavior.	Such	a	robot	may	need	to	control	the	
operation	of	 its	 lower-level	 behavioral	 programs	on	 the	basis	 of	 reasoning	
about	the	consequences	of	its	own	actions	(viewed	objectively)	in	its	environ-
































intentionality	 that	 something	 is	meaningful	 and	has	content.	When	applied	





































The	 philosophical	 concept	 of	 intentionality,	









































































































something,	 as	 it	must	be.	 (I	mention	 in	passing	 that	 emotions,	which	have	
many	important	connections	to	consciousness,	are	important	in	all	these	ap-
plications	of	autonomous	robotics.)
3. The Hard Problem







(2001)	 and	 Wagner,	 Reggia,	 Uriagereka	 &	
Wilkinson	 (2003);	 unfortunately	 the	 latter	
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tor	of	 intentionality	extending	from	the	observer	 to	 the	observed,	and	so	 it	
involves	them	both	essentially.
Further,	 science	ordinarily	 strives	 to	 separate	 the	 individual,	 subjective	 as-
pects	of	an	observation	(e.g.,	 felt	warmth)	 from	the	objective	aspects	 (e.g.,	
measured	temperature),	about	which	it	is	easier	to	achieve	a	consensus	among	
trained	observers.	However,	 in	 the	Hard	Problem	the	individual,	subjective	
aspects	are	of	central	concern.	Also,	 science	normally	 takes	a	 third-person	
perspective	on	the	phenomena	it	studies	(it, he, she	is,	does,	etc.),	whereas	the	
experience	of	conscious	awareness	is	always	from	a	first-person	perspective	
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The	 inherently	 first-person,	 subjective	 character	 of	 conscious	 experience	
makes	it	resistant	 to	the	ordinary	reductive	patterns	of	science,	for	 it	 is	 the	
third-person,	publicly	observable	aspects	of	phenomena	that	are	most	ame-



















to	 observing	 consciousness).	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 investigate	 the	
aperture,	 because	 it	 affects	 the	 image	 in	 systematic	 ways	 (e.g.,	 brightness,	
diffraction,	focus,	depth	of	field).	 In	particular,	we	can	investigate	changes	
that	occur	with	systematic	variation	of	 the	aperture.	 In	 this	way,	character-











This	 analogy	 suggests	 an	 approach	 to	 observing	 consciousness.	 Although	
consciousness	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 its	 content,	 trained	 observers	 can	
separate	aspects	of	the	conscious	state	that	depend	more	on	its	content	from	
those	that	depend	on	consciousness	itself.	As	in	the	camera	analogy,	inves-






The	 behavior	 of	 a	 linear	 system	 (such	 an	
optical	 system)	 is	 completely	 characterized	
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as	occurs	 in	contemplation	and	meditation	 (e.g.,	 emptiness,	one-point	con-
centration).	More	generally,	consciousness	can	be	investigated	in	laboratory	
situations	that	attempt	to	control	 its	content.	However,	as	our	analogy	sug-





observe	 the	 relevant	phenomena,	as	 they	are	 in	all	 sciences,	but	especially	
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the	displayed	die	as	an	 invitation	 to	some	sport.	All	 this	 is	part	of	 the	rich	
phenomenology	of	so	simple	a	thing	as	a	die.
Accurate	phenomenology	depends	on	awareness	and	investigation	of	all	as-
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cortex	respond	to	visual	stimuli,	and	conversely	neurons	in	visual	cortex	can	






















Although	 there	 is	 much	 that	 we	 do	 not	 know	 about	 neural	 representation,	
these	examples	 suggest	 that	many	 representations	can	be	decomposed	 into	








































interdependencies	 are	 also	 much	 more	 complex	 than	 suggested	 by	 the	 no-
tion	of	elementary	sense	data	(as	is	discussed	below),	so	we	must	beware	of	
an	oversimplified	or	 superficial	understanding	of	protophenomena.	 Indeed,	









together,	 so	 that	 their	macroscopic	motions	are	coherent.	Similarly,	as	will	
be	 explained,	 the	 intensities	 of	 protophenomena	 are	 mutually	 interdepend-











nomena	(as	will	be	explained	below),	 so	 that	a	change	 in	one	protopheno-
menon	would	rarely	be	noticed	(i.e.,	cause	one	to	behave	differently).	As	an	








Such	 as	 microcolumns,	 containing	 perhaps	
eleven	neurons	(Jones,	2000).
12
The	 primary	 protophenomena	 of	 visual	 ex-
perience	appear,	in	fact,	to	be	more	complex	
then	pixels;	psychophysical	evidence	suggests	































Activity Sites and Protophenomenal Intensity
Parallel	reduction	in	the	phenomenological	and	neurological	domains	leads	









which	 cases	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 associated	 protophenomenon	 might	 corre-




graded	electrical	activity	 in	 the	dendritic	 trees	of	neurons,	 rather	 than	with	
all-or-nothing	action	potential	generation.14	On	 this	basis	we	would	expect	
























for	 “red-here-now”	 from	one	 for	 “middle-C-here-now”,	 that	 is,	what	gives	
protophenomena	their	qualitative	character?	The	parallel	question	in	the	neu-
























More	 specifically,	 protophenomena	 theory	
is	an	example	of	what	Chalmers	(2002)	calls 
type-F monism,	 which	 is	 in	 the	 heritage	 of	
Russell	 (1927).	 	 Jung’s	 phenomenological	










See	 Miller,	 Galanter	 &	 Pribram	 (1960,	 pp.	






































the	ferrets	were	experiencing visual perceptions	 in	their	“rewired”	auditory	
cortices.











In	 this	article	 I	will	not	address	phenomenological	changes	 that	 take	place	
































Essay Concerning Human Understanding	 (e.g.,	Hardin,	1988;	MacLennan,	
1999a;	Nida-Rümelin,	1996;	Palmer,	1999).	 Is	 it	possible	 that	 I	experience	






menal	high	pitch	 the	same	sound	frequencies	 that	you	experience	as	a	 low	
pitch,	and	vice	versa,	but	this	apparent	possibility	rests	on	a	superficial	phe-
nomenology	of	pitch,	which	can	be	exposed	by	systematic	variation	of	 the	
phenomena.	On	one	hand,	 if	we	gradually	 increase	 the	 subjective	pitch	of	











Additional	 evidence	 comes	 from	 “referred	
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This	phenomenological	analysis	is	reinforced	by	neuroscience,	for	higher	fre-
quencies	are	mapped	spatially	 in	auditory	cortex	 in	 tonotopic	maps,	which	


















and	analogies	with	sound	 (pitch	and	wavelength).	 Indeed,	prior	 to	Newton	
color	was	less	likely	to	be	understood	as	a	linear	spectrum,	but	his	discovery	


































































by	 a	 process	 of	 phenomenological	 “augmentation”	 (Steigerung)	 of	 yellow	
and	blue	(§	699–703),	one	can	produce	a	very	pure	red	(Purpur),	“like	fine	
carmine	on	white	porcelain”	(§	792).	(In	this	connection	it’s	worth	recalling	
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clude	 that	undetectable	color	 inversions	are	 impossible.	Furthermore,	 these	
neurophenomenological	investigations	provide	a	basis	for	constructing	a	to-
pology	of	color	experience	that	is	more	accurate	than	a	linear	scale	or	simple	
double-opponent	 color	 wheel	 (MacLennan,	 1999b).	 In	 some	 cases	 we	 can	















they	 are	 green	 in	 color.	 Similarly,	 many	 other	 color	 terms	 were	 originally	
monovalent	terms	for	minerals,	dyes,	and	other	substances,	and	seem	to	be	
polyvalent	only	when	supposed	to	refer	to	ranges	of	wavelengths;	for	exam-












among	 the	protophenomena,	which	 is	 the	 causal	 nexus	 of	 the	phenomenal	
world.
This	conclusion	is	supported	by	empirical	evidence	from	cerebral	commis-












stem	 intact.	Thus	 some	connections	between	 the	hemispheres	 remain,	pro-
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
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B.	 J.	 MacLennan,	 Consciousness:	 Natural	
and	Artificial421
ducing	two	loosely	coupled	phenomenal	worlds,	whereas	we	would	expect	





actions	 establish	 loose	 dependencies	 between	 the	 two	 phenomenal	 worlds	
(in	one	patient’s	head),	which	differ	only	 in	degree	 from	 the	dependencies	




























as	 likely	substrates	 for	 the	unconscious	mind	 (e.g.,	Stevens,	2003,	ch.	13),	
but	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 suppose	 that	 neurons	 in	 these	 areas	 do	 not	 have	




















It	might	 seem	unlikely	 that	 these	semi-independent	conscious	minds	could	
exist	unseen	in	the	normal	brain,	but	we	must	recall	that	initially	it	was	not	
obvious	that	the	split-brain	patients	had	two	conscious	minds;	they	appeared	
perfectly	 normal	 until	 laboratory	 testing	 revealed	 anomalies.	 Similarly,	 in	
the	 normal	 human	 it	 may	 be	 the	 mind	 that	 includes	 the	 verbal	 and	 motor	
protophenomena	that	is	most	able	to	manifest	its	existence	in	behavior	and	
is	most	easily	identified	with	the	ego.	Other	minds,	which	are	more	remote	















































































sizes	 (1)	 that	neural	 firing	 induces	 an	endogenous EM field,	 that	 this	 field	
influences	neural	activity,	and	that	this	feedback	through	the	endogenous	EM	
field	 is	 essential	 to	 neural	 information	 processing,	 and	 (2)	 reportable	 con-
scious	experience	(i.e.,	conscious	experience	that	can	result	 in	publicly	ob-
servable	behavior)	 is	associated	with	a	component	of	 this	 field	 that	affects	
motor	neurons.21
18
This	 hypothesis	 does	 not	 exclude	 the	 first	
possibility,	 namely	 that	 protophenomena	 in	




See	 Miller,	 Galanter	 &	 Pribram	 (1960,	 pp.	




















































What Physical Processes Have Protophenomena?
I	have	discussed	protophenomena	in	terms	of	human	consciousness,	but	it	is	
now	time	to	consider	 them	also	 in	 the	context	of	 robot	consciousness.	The	
crucial	question	is	whether	robot	brains	can	be	made	sufficiently	similar	to	







































When	 we	 know	 the	 answer	 to	 this	 question,	 then	 we	 can	 say	 whether	 the	
constituents	of	a	robot’s	brain	have	the	relevant	properties	to	have	protophe-
nomena.
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capacity	 to	 suffer.	 Cruel	 practices,	 such	 as	 vivisection,	 have	 been	 justified	
by	the	claim	that	“beasts”	(non-human	animals)	are	“just	machines”,	a	view	
that	became	widespread	with	the	ascendancy	of	the	mechanical	philosophy	
of	Gassendi	 and	Descartes.	 (According	 to	 this	 philosophy,	 humans	–	or	 at	
least	some	humans!	–	were	considered	more	than	machines	because	they	have	
“immortal	souls”;	in	contrast,	animals	were	considered	soulless.)	Nowadays,	
although	 there	 is	 ongoing	debate	 about	 the	 existence	 and	 extent	 of	 animal	
rights,	we	do	acknowledge	animal	suffering	and	try	to	avoid	it	(at	least	for	
some	animals:	cattle,	but	chickens?	lobsters?	oysters?).26	So	I	think	it	is	likely	
that	we	will	 face	 similar	 issues	 regarding	 sophisticated	autonomous	 robots	
(especially	those	made	out	of	organic	materials).



















independent	 of	 consciousness;	 indeed,	 very	 simple	 agents	 (organisms	 and	
machines)	can	exhibit	genuine	intrinsic	intentionality.	Nevertheless,	truly	au-












In	 this	 connection	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 recall	
that	 Gabor’s	 quantum	 of	 information,	 the	
logon,	 is	 mathematically	 identical	 to	 a	 pure 





















Bekoff,	M.	(2007)	The Emotional Lives of Animals. A Leading Scientist Explores Animal 
Joy, Sorrow, and Empathy – and Why They Matter,	New	York:	New	World	Library.
Bendor,	D.,	and	Wang,	X.	(2005)	“The	neuronal	representation	of	pitch	in	primate	auditory	
cortex”,	Nature,	vol.	436,	pp.	1161–5.
Berlin,	B.,	and	Kay,	P.	(1969)	Basic Color Terms. Their Universality and Evolution,	Ber-
keley:	University	of	California.
Blackburn,	S.	 (1994)	The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press.
Block,	N.	 (1995)	 “On	a	 confusion	about	 a	 function	of	 consciousness”,	Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences,	vol.	18,	pp.	265–66.
Brentano,	F.	(1995)	Psychology from and Empirical Standpoint,	trans.	A.	C.	Rancurello,	D.	
B.	Terrell,	and	L.	L.	McAlister,	London	&	New	York:	Routledge.
Bridgeman,	B.	 (1982)	“Multiplexing	 in	 single	cells	of	 the	alert	monkey’s	visual	 cortex	
during	brightness	discrimination”,	Neuropsychologia,	vol.	20,	pp.	33–42.
Brooks,	R.	A.	(1987)	“A	Hardware	Retargetable	Distributed	Layered	Architecture	for	Mo-
bile	 Robot	 Control”,	 in	 Proceedings IEEE Robotics and Automation,	 Raleigh,	 NC,	 pp.	
106–110.
Burghardt,	G.	M.	(1970)	“Defining	‘Communication’”,	in	J.	W.	Johnston,	Jr.,	D.	G.	Moul-
ton,	and	A.	Turk	(eds.),	Communication by Chemical Signals,	New	York:	Appleton-Cen-
tury-Crofts,	pp.	5–18.










Chalmers,	D.	J.	(2002)	“Consciousness	and	its	place	in	nature”,	in	Philosophy of Mind: 
Classical and Contemporary Readings,	D.	Chalmers	(ed.),	Oxford:	Oxford.
Cherry,	C.	(1978)	On Human Communication,	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT.
Cook,	N.	D.	 (2000)	“On	defining	awareness	and	consciousness:	The	 importance	of	 the	




B.	 J.	 MacLennan,	 Consciousness:	 Natural	
and	Artificial429
Cook,	N.	D.	(2002a)	“Bihemispheric	language:	How	the	two	hemispheres	collaborate	in	
the	processing	of	language”,	in	The Speciation of Modern Homo Sapiens,	T.	Crow	(ed.),	
London:	Proceedings	of	the	British	Academy.
Cook,	N.	D.	(2002b)	Tone of Voice and Mind. The Connections Between Intonation, Emo-





Dretske,	F.	(1985)	“Machines	and	the	mental”,	Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association,	vol.	59,	pp.	23–33.
Dreyfus,	H.	L.	(1991)	Being-in-the-World. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being	and	Time, 
Division I,	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press.
Dunny,	G.	M.,	and	Winans,	S.	C.	(eds.)	(1999)	Cell-cell Signaling in Bacteria,	Washin-
gton,	D.C.:	ASM	Press.
Gabor,	D.	(1946)	“Theory	of	communication”,	Journal of the Institution of Electrical En-
gineers,	vol.	93,	pt.	III,	pp.	429–57.








Gregory,	R.	L.	(ed.)	(1987)	The Oxford Companion to the Mind,	Oxford:	Oxford	Univer-
sity	Press.
Grice,	H.	P.	(1957)	“Meaning”,	Philosophical Review,	vol.	66,	pp.	377–88.
Gutenplan,	S.	(ed.)	(1994)	A Companion to the Philosophy of the Mind,	Oxford:	Blackwell.
Hardin,	 C.L.	 (1988)	 Color for Philosophers. Unweaving the Rainbow,	 Indianapolis	 &	
Cambridge:	Hackett.




Heidegger,	M.	(1982)	The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,	trans.	A.	Hofstadter,	Bloo-
mington:	Indiana	University	Press.
Hempel,	C.	G.	(1965)	Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosop-
hy of Science,	New	York:	The	Free	Press.
Hering,	E.	(1878)	Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinne,	Wien:	Carl	Gerold’s	Sohn.
Husserl,	E.	(1931)	Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,	trans.	W.	R.	B.	
Gibson,	New	York:	Macmillan.
Husserl,	E.	(1960)	Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology,	 trans.	D.	
Cairns,	The	Hague:	Nijhoff.




B.	 J.	 MacLennan,	 Consciousness:	 Natural	
and	Artificial430
Ihde,	D.	(1986)	Experimental Phenomenology. An Introduction,	Albany:	State	University	
of	New	York	Press.
John,	E.	R.	 (2002)	“The	neurophysics	of	consciousness”,	Brain Research Reviews,	vol.	
39,	pp.	1–28.
Jones,	E.	G.	(2000)	“Microcolumns	in	the	cerebral	cortex”,	Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences USA,	vol.	97,	pp.	5019–21.
Jung,	C.	G.	(1960)	The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche	(Collected Works,	vol.	8),	
2nd	ed.,	trans.	R.	F.	C.	Hull,	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.
Jung,	C.	G.	(1969a)	The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious	(Collected Works,	vol.	
9,	part	i),	2nd	ed.,	trans.	R.	F.	C.	Hull,	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.
Jung,	C.	G.	(1969b)	Psychology and Religion: West and East	(Collected	Works,	vol.	11),	
2nd	ed.,	trans.	R.	F.	C.	Hull,	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.











Laughlin,	C.	D.,	Jr.,	McManus,	J.,	and	d’Aquili,	E.	G.	(1990)	Brain, Symbol and Experien-
ce. Toward a Neurophenomenology of Consciousness,	Boston:	New	Science	Library.
MacKay,	D.M.	(1969)	Information, Mechanism and Meaning,	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT.
MacLennan,	B.	J.	(1990)	Evolution of Communication in a Population of Simple Machines	
(Technical	Report	UT-CS-90–99),	Knoxville:	University	of	Tennessee,	Knoxville,	Depar-
tment	of	Computer	Science.




tion”,	in	Artificial Life II. The Second Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living 
Systems,	C.	G.	Langton,	C.	Taylor,	J.	D.	Farmer,	and	S.	Rasmussen	(eds.),	Redwood	City:	
MIT	Press,	pp.	631–658.
MacLennan,	 B.	 J.	 (1995)	 “The	 investigation	 of	 consciousness	 through	 phenomenology	
and	neuroscience”,	in	Scale in Conscious Experience. Is the Brain Too Important to be Left 
to Specialists to Study?,	J.	King	and	K.	H.	Pribram	(eds.),	Hillsdale:	Lawrence	Erlbaum,	
pp.	25–43.
MacLennan,	 B.	 J.	 (1996a)	 “The	 elements	 of	 consciousness	 and	 their	 neurodynamical	
correlates”,	Journal of Consciousness Studies,	vol.	3,	pp.	409–424.




jectivity	barrier”,	Behavioral and Brain Sciences,	vol.	22,	961–3.
MacLennan,	B.	J.	(1999b)	The Protophenomenal Structure of Consciousness with Especial 









MacLennan,	B.	 J.	 (in	press)	 “Protophenomena:	The	elements	of	 consciousness	 and	 their	






dings in the Philosophy of Science,	E.	D.	Klemke,	R.	Hollinger,	and	A.	D.	Kline	(eds.),	
Buffalo:	Prometheus	Books.
McCall,	R.	J.	(1983)	Phenomenological Psychology. An Introduction. With a Glossary of 
Some Key Heideggerian Terms,	Madison:	University	of	Wisconsin	Press.
McFaddin,	J.	(2002)	“Synchronous	firing	and	its	influence	on	the	brain’s	electromagnetic	




Miller,	G.	A.,	Galanter,	E.,	and	Pribram,	K.	H.	(1960)	Plans and the Structure of Behavior,	
New	York:	Adams-Bannister-Cox.




Pockett,	S.	(2000)	The Nature of Consciousness: A Hypothesis,	Lincoln:	Iuniverse.
Pockett,	S.	(2002)	“Difficulties	with	the	electromagnetic	theory	of	consciousness”,	Jour-




conception”,	The Quarterly Review of Biology,	vol.	70,	pp.	393–421.
Pribram,	K.	H.	(1971)	Languages of the Brain: Experimental Paradoxes and Principles in 
Neuropsychology,	Englewood	Cliffs:	Prentice-Hall.






Rizzolatti	G.,	Craighero	L.	(2004)	“The	mirror-neuron	system”,	Annual Review of Neuro-
science,	vol.	27,	pp.	169–92.
Russell,	B.	(1927)	The Analysis of Matter,	London:	Kegan	Paul.
Saunders,	B.	A.	C.,	and	van	Brakel,	J.	(1997)	“Are	there	non-trivial	constraints	on	colour	
categorization?”,	Behavioral and Brain Sciences,	vol.	20,	167–228.




B.	 J.	 MacLennan,	 Consciousness:	 Natural	
and	Artificial432
Searle,	J.	(1992)	Rediscovery of the Mind,	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	1992.




Stevens,	A.	(2003)	Archetype Revisited. An Updated Natural History of the Self,	Toronto:	
Inner	City	Books.
Suga,	N.	(1984)	“The	extent	to	which	biosonar	information	is	represented	in	the	bat	audi-
tory	cortex”,	in	G.	M.	Edelman,	W.	E.	Gall,	and	W.M.	Cowan	(eds.),	Dynamic Aspects of 
Neocortical Function,	New	York:	Wiley,	pp.	315–73.
Suga,	N.	(1989)	“Principles	of	auditory	information-processing	derived	from	neuroetholo-





development	and	function”,	in	Handbook of Multisensory Processing,	B.	Stein	(ed.),	Cam-
bridge,	MA:	MIT	Press.
Wagner,	K.,	Reggia,	J.	A.,	Uriagereka,	J.,	and	Wilkinson,	G.	S.	(2003)	“Progress	 in	 the	
simulation	 of	 emergent	 communication	 and	 language”,	 Adaptive Behavior,	 vol.	 11	 (1),	
pp.	37–69.
Weiskrantz,	L.	(1995)	“Blindsight:	Conscious	vs.	unconscious	aspects”,	in	Scale in Con-
scious Experience. Is the Brain Too Important to be Left to Specialists to Study?	J.	King	
and	K.	H.	Pribram	(eds.),	Hillsdale:	Lawrence	Erlbaum.
Wheeler,	J.	A.	(1994)	“It	from	bit”,	in	At Home in the Universe,	J.	A.	Wheeler,	Woodbury:	
American	Institute	of	Physics	Press.
Zajonc,	A.	(1993)	Catching the Light. The Entwined History of Light and Mind,	New	York:	
Bantam	Books.
Bruce J. MacLennan
Natürliches und künstliches Bewusstsein
Zusammenfassung
Ausgehend von Erkenntnissen der Evolutionären Psychologie untersucht dieser Beitrag wich-
tige Funktionen, die das Bewusstsein autonomer Roboter ausfüllen kann. Gemeint sind will-
kürlich kontrolliertes Handeln, bewusstes Wahrnehmen, Eigenwahrnehmung, Metaerkenntnis 
sowie Bewusstsein des eigenen Selbst. Der Verfasser unterscheidet zwischen intrinsischer In-
tentionalität und Bewusstsein, führt jedoch das Argument ins Feld, dass es ebenso wichtig sei, 
die Erkenntnisweise eines Roboters zu verstehen. Abschließend wird, aus dem Blickwinkel der 
Theorie von den Protophänomenen, das für Roboter „schwierige Problem” untersucht, d.h. die 
Frage, ob sie zu subjektiver Wahrnehmung fähig sind.
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Résumé
En s’appuyant sur les résultats de la psychologie évolutionniste, nous examinons les différen-
tes fonctions importantes que puisse remplir la conscience dans les robots autonomes : action 
contrôlée, prise de conscience, conscience de soi, métacognition, conscience du moi. Nous dis-
tinguons l’intentionnalité intrinsèque de la conscience, mais soutenons également l’importance 
de la compréhension de la cognition robotique. Enfin, nous étudions le « Hard Problem » con-
cernant les robots, c’est-à-dire la question de savoir s’ils peuvent connaître une prise de consci-
ence subjective, dans une perspective de la théorie du protophénomène.
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